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ABSTRACT
Falcon 1, the entry vehicle in the Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) launch vehicle family, is designed to
provide the world’s lowest cost access to orbit. The vehicle is designed above all for high reliability, followed by
low cost and a benign payload flight environment. It is a two-stage, liquid oxygen and rocket grade kerosene (RP-1)
powered launch vehicle capable of placing a 700 kg satellite into a 200km circular orbit, inclined 9.1 degrees.
Falcon 1 combines a re-usable, turbo-pump fed first stage powered by a single SpaceX Merlin engine with a
pressure fed second stage powered by our Kestrel engine and capable of multiple re-starts.
A brief summary of the March 24th, 2006 maiden demonstration launch of Falcon 1 from the SpaceX Omelek Island
launch facility in the Kwajalein Atoll is presented along with a detailed account of the more recent Demo 2 mission
which took flight on March 21st, 2007 from the same location. Though orbit was not achieved on the Demo 2
mission, a significant majority of mission objectives were met from both programmatic and technical perspectives.
Details of the eight flight anomalies experienced during the Demo 2 mission are presented herein.
Consistent with SpaceX’s corporate philosophy of rapid and continuous improvement, Falcon 1 has a planned
upgrade path based upon experience from the Demonstration missions. These vehicle enhancements will be
implemented as a block upgrade and will increase the payload capacity to orbit over that of the current Falcon 1
configuration.
The Falcon 1 manifest is presented and includes five additional Falcon 1 launches before the end of 2009 with two
taking place from Omelek Island in the Kwajalein Atoll and three from Vandenberg Air Force Base.

FALCON 1 LAUNCH VEHICLE OVERVIEW

DEMO 1 MISSION SUMMARY

The Falcon 1 is a two stage launch vehicle
approximately 70’ in height with a Gross Lift-Off
Weight (GLOW) of about 61,000 lbm. The first stage
for the Demonstration missions was powered by the
Merlin 1A pump-fed RP-1/liquid oxygen (LOX)
engine. The 2nd stage is powered by the pressure-fed
Kestrel engine, also burning RP-1/LOX. This vehicle
was developed entirely by SpaceX under funding
provided by SpaceX founder, Mr. Elon Musk.

The first test flight in March 2006 suffered a fuel leak
in the 1st stage engine prior to lift-off, which resulted in
an engine fire and subsequent loss of thrust at T+34
seconds. DARPA and SpaceX conducted an extensive
mishap and return to flight investigation and concluded
that the most probable leak cause was due to
intergranular cracking of an aluminum alloy B-nut.
SpaceX implemented vehicle design and procedural
changes to address identified flight anomalies as well as
to improve system robustness and reliability.
Noteworthy changes included:
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•

Addition of many additional autonomous
sensor checks during the countdown and prior
to vehicle release. These health checks can
generate either warnings for the engineers or
aborts depending on the condition.

•

Elimination of all aluminum fittings in regions
exposed to ambient environments.

•

Fire protection blankets and nitrogen purges in
the engine compartments.

•

Additional quality control measures employed.

As shown in Figure 2, a clear majority of the Demo 2
mission technical objectives were met by this return to
flight. A 2nd stage control anomaly, however,
ultimately prevented the stage from reaching orbital
velocity. Eight technical anomalies have been identified
by post-flight data analysis, thought this 2nd stage
control anomaly was the only known issue that
prevented this mission from achieving orbit. Vehicle
performance was within an acceptable range until
around T+265 seconds when an oscillation in the 2nd
stage control system began to appear. This instability
grew over time until about T+474 seconds when the
engine shut down. Flight data indicate that propellant
slosh is the most probable root cause of the control
anomaly, which resulted in a vehicle roll rate sufficient
to centrifuge propellant and cause flame-out of the
Kestrel engine. Analysis of vehicle telemetry indicates
the vehicle would have attained orbit if the 2nd stage
engine had continued to burn. The vehicle attained a
peak altitude of 289 km, 5.1 km/s maximum velocity
and remained in the center of the intended ground track
throughout flight.

DEMO 2 MISSION OVERVIEW
Overview
On March 21, 2007 SpaceX launched the second
demonstration flight of the Falcon 1 launch vehicle.
The mission was sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the US Air
Force (USAF) with objectives centered around testing
the vehicle in flight, gathering data and retiring
technical risk prior to the first operational flight to
launch the TacSat-1 spacecraft.

Significant achievements for the Demo 2 flight include
successful demonstration and verification of:

This mission, Demonstration Flight 2 or “Demo 2”, was
the return to flight of the Falcon 1 after significant
modifications following the inaugural flight, as
described above. Like the inaugural flight, this mission
was launched from facilities on Omelek Island, part of
Reagan Test Site (RTS) on Kwajalein Atoll in the
Marshall Islands. All launch and control facilities,
including the Mission Control Center, the launch pad
and the vehicle and payload integration facilities were
also developed entirely by SpaceX.

•

Ground control & support systems, including
control software, highly automated operations
& autonomous abort

•

Rapid response capability – launched after hotfire abort

•

1st stage performance and control from lift-off
through Main Engine Cut-Off (MECO)

•

Vehicle structural performance & margins
through lift-off, transonic & max-Q

•

Stage separation

•

2nd stage ignition

•

Fairing separation

•

2nd stage engine performance in vacuum

•

Guidance, navigation & control performance
through T+~300s, including transonic

•

Flight software through all major flight
domains

•

Launch & flight environments: thermal, shock
& vibration

•

Aero-thermal and base-heating (both stages)
results

Figure 1 – The day before launch on Omelek Island
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demonstrated. Programmatically, 24 mission objectives
were explicitly listed in the contract, including some
high-level technical objectives. 17 of these were fully
achieved, plus another 5 were partially demonstrated. In
each case, those objectives that were not demonstrated,
or only partially so, were in phases of flight not reached
before shut-down.

Operational Responsiveness

Significant
breakthroughs
in
Operational
Responsiveness were also demonstrated by this
mission. The entire mission timeline, from Customer
Kick-off to launch, was achieved in 8 months and one
week (this included significant vehicle design changes,
re-qualification of vehicle avionics, refurbishment of
the launch site and integration of a complex payload).
The vehicle integration process was non-contiguous due
to several interruptions due to technical issues
associated with the developmental status of
Overall Objectives Demostrated
the Falcon 1. However when the initial
integration timeline from arrival up to Flight
5% 1%
3%
Readiness Review (FRR) is combined with the
5%
final launch campaign (Roll-out onward), the
resulting total campaign duration is only 39
days from arrival at the launch site to launch.
This assumes only 10 hour work days and
could be shortened significantly by employing
24/7 work crews. Furthermore, this 39 day
campaign included a full Static Fire,
associated data analysis and re-configuration
Demonstrated; complete success
for launch. When Static Fire and associated
Demonstrated; partial success
86%
Demonstrated; unsuccessful
activities are removed from the actual
Not Demonstrated or Not Applicable
campaign timeline, this mission came close to
In Work; further analysis required
achieving the original DARPA Falcon
Program objective for “Call-up” (Storage to
Propulsion (stage 1)
Propulsion (stage 2)
Structures/Mechanisms
Alert Status) of <24hrs (assuming a 24/7 work
force), and did easily achieve the objective for
Alert Status to Launch of <24hrs. The values
derived from the actual timeline are 47hrs and
6hrs respectively and are projected to fall to
Avionics
GNC
FTS
35hrs and 4hrs respectively in an operational
system.
3%

8%

9%

17%

17%

42%

4%

61%

9%

97%

11%

33%

4%

8%

9%

9%

5%

This mission also demonstrated a highly
autonomous ground control system and rapid
recycle from a hot-fire abort to launch in
under 70 minutes. On launch day, the first
countdown was autonomously aborted by
control software at T-0.5 seconds, when it
detected that engine chamber pressure was
~0.2% under the designated threshold. After a partial
de-tank and re-tank to warm the fuel, the vehicle was
launched on the second attempt. This successful rapid
turn-around would not have been possible without the
autonomous ground control software and autosequences developed for the Falcon 1.

76%

Ground Systems

100%

100%

Ground Control Software

100%

Figure 2 - Demo 2 Technical Objectives

Payload
A payload was accommodated on this flight as a
secondary objective at the request of DARPA/AF. Part
of this payload was the Autonomous Flight Safety
System (AFSS) and the Low Cost TDRSS Transmitter
(LCT2), plus associated hardware, battery and
antennas. AFSS is a rule-based autonomous flight
termination system (FTS), which operated in shadow
mode for this mission and was not connected to the
vehicle FTS. AFSS and LCT2 are a NASA-developed

Mission Objectives
Figure 2 shows mission technical objectives for the
vehicle and ground systems, broken down by
subsystem. Overall, 86% of technical objective are
considered to be fully achieved by this mission and
associated risks retired. An additional 5% were partially
Bjelde

78%

3

21st Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

launch vehicle payload aimed at reducing range
communications & tracking costs including flight
termination system support from the ground during
flight. On this flight the LCT2 was configured to
transmit AFSS data back to the Mission Control Center,
closing a link through a TDRSS spacecraft during
terminal count on the launch pad and continuing to
transmit through orbit insertion.

contributed in any way to other flight anomalies or
observations. SpaceX is investigating whether QD
panel installation may have been a potential contributor
and is also re-evaluating the design of QD panels and
considering implementing a secondary QD separation
mechanism.

Due to SpaceX concerns about a possible Radio
Frequency Interference (RFI) issue between vehicle
systems and LCT2, based on three suspicious events in
the days before launch, the decision was made by
SpaceX, with DARPA’s concurrence, to fly with LCT2
powered down. Consequently LCT2 was not
demonstrated during flight. Some AFSS data, however,
were also embedded in the vehicle telemetry stream,
allowing them to exceed minimum success criteria even
without LCT2. An investigation of this RFI issue was
performed post-flight and did identify the potential for
subtle and intermittent interaction between these
systems though the observed effects could not be
reproduced under flight-like conditions. This interaction
appears to be due to a susceptibility of the vehicle GPS
receiver and not to the LCT2 transmitter itself.

Two parts to this anomaly:

3. 1st Stage Trajectory Performance

a. An outdated Propellant Utilization (PU) file set
was loaded into the Engine Computer. The PU function
is initiated at T+20s and governs the limits of the Fuel
Trim Valve and therefore the engine mixture ratio. This
error resulted in an incorrect setting for the Fuel Trim
Valve high limit. The impact on the flight was an
altered thrust profile. Thrust was lower than intended
early in the flight resulting in increased gravity losses
and causing the first stage trajectory to be slightly lower
and slower than predicted. The vehicle could still have
achieved the intended orbit however, if not for
Anomaly 7 below (2nd stage control anomaly). This
anomaly is fundamentally a configuration control issue
since this configuration file was not verified prior to
launch. SpaceX is revising the pre-launch sign-off
process to ensure all configuration files are reviewed
and signed-off prior to loading.

Anomalies
There were eight significant Anomalies identified
during analysis of flight data, including the 2nd stage
control issue. Addressing and correcting these items
constitute a constraint on the next flight of the Falcon 1
vehicle. These anomalies are summarized below.

b. The 1st stage LOX tank ullage pressure dropped
near end of the burn causing the LOX pump to cavitate
(chug) and inducing Pogo. This is attributed to low
helium margin and helium temperature. This issue is
being addressed by revisiting tank pressure set-points
and pressure control dead-bands.

1. 2nd Stage LOX Quick Disconnect (QD) failed to
disconnect during lift-off

4. 2nd Stage Propellant Utilization (PU) did not control
tank pressure to regulate engine mixture ratio

This resulted in the LOX QD panel (with QD) and ~2”
of LOX fill line separating from vehicle. An internal
LOX check-value prevented any loss of propellant from
the vehicle and there is no evidence of other damage to
the stage nor that this contributed in any way to other
flight anomalies or observations. SpaceX is planning to
either work with the QD vendor to correct this issue or
develop a “Hybrid” QD panel in house using supplier
(Wiggins) part(s).

The second stage PU function does not appear to have
operated correctly during the 2nd stage engine burn.
This anomaly is still under active investigation and may
be a secondary effect of other anomalies. If Anomaly 7
below (2nd stage control anomaly) had not occurred,
this anomaly would have resulted in higher residual
propellant at the end of 2nd stage burn, decreasing the
vehicle’s performance and mass margin by an unknown
amount.

2. 1st Stage LOX, Fuel and Electrical QD’s failed to
disconnect per design at lift-off

5. Re-contact during stage separation

The LOX and fuel QDs each traveled several inches
further with the vehicle than intended before separating
nominally at the connectors. The Electrical QD lanyard
broke and pulled the umbilical approximately 18”
before separating at the ground-side connector backshell. Apart from a roll correction maneuver as the
vehicle lifted off the pad, there is no indication these
Bjelde

The nozzle of the Kestrel engine made contact with the
interstage section as they separated after MECO. This
occurred due to higher than anticipated rotation rates,
both of the combined vehicle stack prior to separation,
and of the 2nd stage after separation but before clearing
the interstage section. This rotation occurred during
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long stand-off distance was required for the recovery
vessel which resulted in travel time to the splash-down
site of 4~5 hours. SpaceX is planning to add
redundancy to the GPS locator system and increased
thermal protection to the stage. It should be noted that
recovery of this stage was a SpaceX-internal goal only
and not a customer requirement.

unpowered flight between MECO and 2nd stage
ignition. The Merlin 1st stage engine was pointing
slightly off center-of-mass at shutdown and off-axis
forces due to thrust tail-off and engine purge account
for some of these rotational torques on the stack. The
remainder of this rotation is currently attributed to aeroloading of both the combined stack and the 2nd stage
after separation, due to being 15 km lower than
expected during stage separation. This anomaly is
therefore directly attributable to Anomaly 3 above.

Vehicle Performance Assessment
Prior to the upper stage control anomaly, vehicle
retained ample margin to reach orbit. Even with this
anomaly, if the instability had not resulted in a roll,
vehicle still retained enough margin to reach orbit. Due
to performance-optimizing saturation in guidance
algorithm, vehicle would have been 6 km low at perigee
(i.e. 324 x 685 km) at orbital insertion, which is wellwithin stated insertion accuracy on ±10 km.

6. One of two Marmon clamp joints failed to separate at
fairing jettison
The Marmon band that clamps the bottom of the
payload fairing until jettison is retained by two
redundant pyro-bolts. Video observation shows that the
two halves of this band are apparently still joined as it
falls away from the vehicle. The other bolt did fire and
the fairing halves separated nominally. This anomaly is
still under investigation. All pre-flight test data appears
nominal. Vehicle telemetry is not be of sufficient time
resolution to deduce whether both pyros actually drew
current.

Translating this performance to the industry-standard
circular reference orbits, this specific vehicle could
have inserted masses shown in Table 1 into orbit.
Table 1 - Extrapolated Vehicle Performance
From:

nd

7. Loss of Control of 2 Stage

Kwajalein

An oscillation appeared in the 2nd stage control system
approximately 90 seconds into the burn. This instability
grew in pitch and yaw axes initially, then after about 30
seconds induced a roll also. This roll eventually built up
to a rate sufficient to centrifuge the liquid propellants
and causing flame-out of the Kestrel engine. Although
multiple potential causes are still under investigation,
there is high confidence that LOX slosh was the
primary contributor to this instability. This vehicle did
not use slosh baffles in the second stage tanks. They are
now being designed for inclusion in future flights,
along with other possibly complementary mitigations,
including potential adjustments to guidance rules.
Observed excessive 2nd stage helium usage is a
secondary effect of this anomaly due to ullage chilling
by LOX movement inside the tank.

Cape Canaveral

Altitude

With S1
PU Anomaly

Without S1
PU Anomaly

9°

200 km

582 lbm

666 lbm

28.5°

185 km
(100 nmi)

551 lbm

635 lbm

Demo 2 Mission Conclusions
This mission, although short of complete success, was
nonetheless a large step forward for SpaceX and the
Falcon 1 launch vehicle and the DARPA/USAF Falcon
Program. A significant majority of mission objectives
were met from both programmatic and technical
perspectives. Many significant risks were retired in
each major flight domain and open issues were
identified.
Obtaining flight data from the vehicle was a primary
objective of this test flight and was clearly achieved
based on both the quantity and quality of performance
and environmental data. Additionally, operations
concepts, procedures, ground systems and control
automation systems were validated. A rapid response
capability was also demonstrated with a hot-fire abort
being followed within 70 minutes by a launch.
Significant
achievements
in
Operational
Responsiveness for Call-up and Launch were also
demonstrated.

8. 1st Stage Location and Recover
The 1st stage was not recovered as planned. The
recovery vessel received no signals from the electronic,
sonar or visible location aids. The Range tracked the
stage and received telemetry after MECO until it
dropped below the horizon, but it was still at ~50 km
altitude at that time. The parachute nominally deploys
at 4 km altitude. Consequently there are no data to
verify parachute system deployment. There were also
significant delays reaching predicted splash-down point
due to inaccurate landing location assessments from the
Range which were initially approximately 20nm off. A
Bjelde
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Stage 1 recovery not demonstrated and represents the
only operational domain from which data were not
attained by this mission. Additionally stage 2 coast and
Kestrel re-start was not demonstrated, nor was Payload
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simulator deployment. The LCT2 TDRSS transmitter
was flown un-powered; AFSS/LCT2 will be flown on a
future SpaceX mission. Eight anomalies were identified
which are constraints to next mission. Twenty-four
observations to date will most likely require further
action (changes to procedures, processes, limits, config
files, LCCs, Op notes etc.).

Table 2:

Merlin Engine upgrade path

The many successes of this mission and the large
amount of flight data obtained, including on anomalous
behaviors, have greatly reduced risks for the next
Falcon 1 mission to launch the TacSat-1 spacecraft.
FALCON 1 STATUS
Overview
Due to the successes of the Demo 2 mission in retiring
risks in the ground and flight systems, SpaceX has
declared the Falcon 1 ready to exit the demonstration
program and has upgraded the launch vehicle to
operational status. That being said, there are still a set
of changes that must be made to the vehicle in support
of near term missions to be executed through 2008.
These vehicle changes are called interim upgrades as
they will only be used for a short while before the
larger block upgrade comes to fruition in 2009. The
interim upgrades described here result in an additional
362 lbm (164 kg) of payload capacity which is needed
to support the upcoming operational payloads
requirements.

2. Stage 2 Engine Upgrade
The Stage 2 Kestrel engine is undergoing weight
savings and reliability enhancements. Changes include
a lighter weight and more easily manufactured thrust
frame, a lighter weight ablative chamber, and the LOX
and Fuel main valves and burst disks are being
redesigned for added reliability. The new engine will be
called Kestrel 2 or K2.
3. Stage 2 Tank Upgrade
As a weight savings measure, the stage 2 tank material
has been changed from aluminum 2219 to a 2014
aluminum alloy. In addition, slosh baffles have been
added to both the Fuel and LOX tanks to prevent
further occurrences of the stage 2 loss of control
anomaly experienced during the Demo Flight 2
mission. An illustration of the slosh baffle addition is
shown in Figure 3.

Interim Upgrades
1. Stage 1 Engine Upgrade
An upgraded version of the already qualified Merlin
engine will be used on future missions through 2009.
This engine is intended to increase reliability, increase
Specific Impulse (Isp) by 5-7%, and increase thrust by
~7%. Major changes include upgrading the combustion
chamber from ablatively cooled to regeneratively
cooled, and changing from torch ignition to a
pyrophoric system using TEA-TEB (similar to what is
currently used on the second stage). This new engine
will be called Merlin 1C-F1 or M1CF1 and its
characteristics, as compared with the previously flown
M1A version as well as the future upgrade called M1C
or M1C-F9, are shown in Table 2.

Figure 3 – 2nd Stage baffle upgrade
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Future Upgrades

FALCON 1 FUTURE BLOCK UPGRADES

1. Stage 1 Engine Upgrade

Overview

As depicted in Table 2, the F1e will employ a Merlin
1C (M1C) engine which will be the same engine used
for Falcon 9 missions. The engine will deliver 105,500
lbf Thrust (VAC) with ISP in the 302-304s range.
Upgrades to this engine above and beyond the M1C-F1
include a thrust frame redesign that reduces cost and
manufacturing time, an upgraded turbo pump assembly,
upgraded avionics, and open cell isogrid panels to
mitigate acoustic coupling into the thrust structure
where avionics and other components are mounted.

Consistent with SpaceX’s corporate philosophy of rapid
and continuous improvement, Falcon 1 has a planned
upgrade path based upon experience from the first
missions and our design work on its sister vehicle, the
Falcon 9. Similar to the interim upgrades, the block
enhancements to the Falcon 1, making it a Falcon 1e or
F1e, are all designed to deliver increased payload
capacity along with increase reliability. The future
block upgrades described here will include an upgrade
to the 1st stage tank primary structure to support the
thrust and propellant needs of a full Merlin 1C engine.
This will be the same engine used on the Falcon 9
launch vehicle and has both performance enhancement
as well as reliability enhancements built into it. In
addition, the second stage tank material will be revised
again for mass savings and a larger fairing will be
offered.
These enhancements improve payload
capacity and volume substantially versus the initial
vehicle. A Falcon 1 upgrade path map is shown in

2. Stage 1 Tank Upgrade
The higher thrust of the M1C engine being used on the
F1e would exceed the the qualification margins of the
existing 1st stage tanks. These tanks would also not be
large enough to support the additional propellant needs
of the larger engine.
Therefore, the 1st stage tank
structure will be redesigned, built and qualified to meet
the propellant needs and load requirements of the M1C
engine. This change will stretch the 1st stage tank and
therefore increase the Falcon 1 launch vehicle length
from ~70’ (F1) to ~85’ (F1e) in overall height.

Table 3.

Table 3 – Falcon 1 Upgrade Path
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will use the upgraded Falcon 1e launch vehicle. In
2009, SpaceX plans to pick up launches from its second
operational launch facility at Vandenberg Air Force
Base where SpaceX currently occupies Space Launch
Complex-3 West (SLC-3W).

3. Fairing Upgrade
The added performance of the M1C engine provides for
additional payload capacity which can be in the form of
a heavier or a larger spacecraft. To accommodate the
latter, SpaceX is planning to upgrade the current fairing
design with a volumetrically larger fairing. The current
design is a bi-conic aluminum skin and stringer design
with a diameter of 1.5m (60in). The F1e variant will
be a composite ogive shape with a 1.7m (67in)
diameter. A comparison of the current and planned
fairing designs is illustrated in Figure 4.

Table 4 – Falcon 1 Launch Manifest
Customer

Launch

Vehicle

Falcon Demo
Launch 1*

Q1 2006

Falcon 1

Kwajalein

Launch site

Falcon Demo
Launch 2*

Q1 2007

Falcon 1

Kwajalein

OSD/NRL

Q4 2007

Falcon 1

Kwajalein

ATSB/Malaysia

Q1 2008

Falcon 1

Kwajalein

SpaceDev

Q1 2009

Falcon 1e

Vandenberg AFB

Swedish
Space Corp

Q4 2009

Falcon 1e

Vandenberg AFB

(Proprietary)

Q1 2010

Falcon 1e

Vandenberg AFB

* completed

CONCLUSION
The Demo 2 mission represented a tremendous step
forward for SpaceX and the Falcon 1 launch vehicle.
The Falcon 1 launch vehicle is ready to exit the
demonstration mode and be declared operational status.
The vehicle upgrade path discussed herein will ensure
that launch manifest commitments are met while
continuing to improve on the baseline design, keep cost
low, and reliability high.

Figure 4 – Falcon 1 and Falcon 1e payload fairing
dimension comparison
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The Falcon 1 launch manifest (see Table 4) currently
consists of five additional launches before the end of
2009. The next launch will be the first operational
launch of Falcon 1 carrying a US Government Satellite,
TacSAT-1, which will then be followed by the launch
of satellite for ATSB of Malaysia which will include a
handful of secondary satellites. Both of these launches
will be on the standard Falcon 1 with the interim
upgrades and are to be launched from Omelek Island in
the Kwajalein Atoll. The launches in 2009 and beyond
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